We estimate a panel of 56 bilateral country-relationships of 7 home and 8 host countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1995-2003 using a panel gravity-model setting to analyze the role of taxation as a determinant of FDI. While gravity variables explain most of the variation of FDI inflows, the bilateral effective average tax rate is also an important determinant of the location decisions and roughly equally important to other cost factors. The semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to taxation is between -3.3 and -4.6, which in absolute terms is above those of earlier studies. This can partly be attributed to using a superior measure of corporate income tax burden.
I. Introduction
Governments in Central and East European Countries (CEECs) intervene to influence the location choice of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) by various measures. They provide incentive packages, fiscal and non-fiscal, and they try to shape various location factors in order to attract foreign firms. Here we focus on the corporate income tax rate which is commonly believed to exert a large impact on the profitability of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and hence on the location choices of MNEs.
Data reveal that a close relationship between FDI and corporate income taxation is indeed plausible. First, the data show a remarkable surge of European and US direct investment into the CEECs during the last years. A considerable variation over time and between host and home countries in the distribution of FDI is discernible (see tables 1 and 2).
[ Table 1 here] Table 1 reveals that there was a surge in FDI inflows to selected CEECs since 1995. This was accentuated during the 2000-2003 sub-period, where the average of inflows is everywhere higher than for the first sub-period, with the exception of Hungary. Also note that larger countries receive the highest FDI inflows.
[ Table 2 here] Table 2 shows the origin of FDI stock. The three most important home countries are Germany, The Netherlands and Austria. The large share of Austria in Slovenia and Croatia as well as the large shares of Germany and the Netherlands in all countries but Slovenia are striking. The data also reveal that most of the FDI stock is owned by European Investors.
There is a striking difference between EU-member and non-member host countries, with Slovenia being under-and Croatia being over-represented, as the seven home countries own above 70 percent of the total stock in member host-countries, but only somewhat more than 50 percent in Bulgaria and Romania.
1
The observed surge in FDI inflows to the CEECs was accompanied by a more or less pronounced drop in the overall statutory corporate income tax rates 1 in most of the CEECs, notably in Slovakia and Poland. 2 (cf . Table 3a) [ Tables 3a and 3b here]
The average decrease of the rates is 14.4 percentage points. Note, that Slovakia started to reduce its rate in 2000 whereas Poland experienced a more gradual fall. The slight increase
in Hungary between 1998 and 2000 is due to an increase in the local business tax. The nonmembers Bulgaria and Romania have the lowest tax rates among these CEECs in 2005.
In comparison, the drop in the rates in the seven main home countries was modest (cf. Table 3b ). The largest reductions occurred in Germany and Italy, the countries with the highest rates in 1996. The average fall is about 5.9 percentage points.
The descriptive evidence therefore suggests the possibility of competition for FDI inter alia via tax-rate cuts. But is this relationship statistically and economically meaningful? The main purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is indeed a significant relationship between the (effective) corporate tax burden and FDI flows to the CEEC. More specifically, the aim of the paper is threefold:
• Examine the role of corporate tax burden as a location factor for FDI in CEECs and compare it to earlier results, via estimating tax-rate elasticities
• Assess the impact of different measures of tax burden on the tax-rate elasticity.
• Analyse the role of taxes compared to other location factors.
A widely used approach to analysing the effect of potential determinants of inward FDI is to regress the chosen dependent variable, such as the log of FDI, on a set of independent variables, which on theoretical grounds (e.g. OLI-paradigm) would likely affect the location choice of an MNE between alternative locations. These variables typically reflect location factors influencing vertical vs. horizontal FDI. The location factor of our main interest is the tax burden which a potential foreign investor faces when choosing a location 1 "Overall" means that local business taxes are included. 2 An overview is given by e.g., Cnossen (2005) .
2 in one of the CEECs. We have chosen a gravity-setting for deriving tax-rate elasticities, which has been widely used to explain trade flows but also FDI flows.
We include FDI from the main home countries (i.e., Austria, Germany, France, Italy, The
Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States of America) to the CEEC host countries, termed CEEC-8 (i.e., Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Romania). The latter are in the centre of the ongoing public debate within the EU about an intensified tax competition. The time span considered here ranges from 1995 to 2003. This paper contributes to our understanding of the determinants of FDI in emerging economies by investigating the often neglected effects of changes in the corporate tax policies of the CEECs on the volume of inward FDI. Moreover the paper distinguishes itself from earlier studies by including a theoretically well founded measure of the tax burden, namely forward-looking tax rates, rather than the statutory tax rate, which has various shortcomings. Our empirical results indicate that the tax-lowering strategies of the CEECs had statistically significant and quantitatively important effects on FDI in
CEECs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II includes a short literature review of results on the role of taxes as drivers of FDI to CEECs. Section III gives some conceptual background and section IV describes our dataset and discusses the variables and the methodology used in the estimation. Section V presents our empirical specification and methodology. Section VI shows our results and provides a discussion. Section VII summarises.
II. The Impact of Taxation on FDI
This subsection takes a brief look at earlier evidence and discusses a number of conceptual points in the remainder. In general very few studies dealing with taxes as drivers of FDI to the CEECs are available (e.g. Javorcik 2004; Carstensen and Toubal 2004; Clausing and Dorubantu 2005) and most studies exclude the taxation issue at all (e.g. Holland and Pain 1998; Frenkel et al. 2004; Buch et al. 2005 Our result implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate will reduce FDI by 1.45
percent.
Yet, these studies use statutory tax rates of the host countries as a measure of corporate tax burden. Therefore, our survey result is more in line with the lower values of -1.2 and -2.05, respectively, derived by DeMooij and Ederveen on studies relying upon statutory tax rates.
However, we question this low tax-rate elasticity. The statutory tax rate is not an appropriate indicator for the tax burden especially in the case of FDI, because it does not include all relevant tax codes. From a conceptual and empirical point of view bilateral forward-looking effective average tax rates (beatrs) should be used Griffith 1999 and Bellak et al. 2006) . Hence the estimated tax-rate elasticities from statutory tax-rates are probably flawed and suffer from some sort of measurement error bias. In our study, we follow Devereux and Griffith 1999 and use beatrs. Consequently we should expect a higher tax-rate elasticity than the one based on statutory tax rates as the survey of DeMooij and Ederveen reveals (tax-rate elasticities of -9.3 and -5.9 respectively, when effective average tax-rates are used).
Besides the argument based on the tax measure, low semi-elasticities may also be explained by the following facts, which are partly transition-specific:
• Tax-cutting strategies of governments may have little impact on FDI, since FDI may reflect strategic decisions by the management and are thus only partly efficiency-driven in the short run (compared to portfolio investment which reacts more directly to changes in profitability).
• As far as FDI flows contribute to expansionary investment of existing capital stock, it may react less than in the case of new investment, Greenfield investment in particular.
3 The papers are: Alfano (2004) , , Beyer (2002) , Carstensen and Toubal (2004) , Edmiston, Mudd and Valev (2003) , Clausing and Dorobantu (2005) , Javorcik (2004) and Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1997;  on European periphery countries). The often cited study of Woodward et al. (2000) was not included, since they examine tax holidays, yet not the tax-rate.
• Given the large number of location factors stated to be relevant for location decisions by firms themselves, taxes may well have a lower relative weight than other location factors.
• Also, the possibility for transfer pricing and other methods of profit shifting may turn the tax burden for MNEs ceteris paribus in a non-issue.
III. Some Conceptual Considerations
The question why a particular country succeeds in the competition for inward FDI can be answered by reference to the OLI-paradigm (Dunning 1988; Markusen 1995 Table 4 )
[ Table 4 here]
According to the OLI-paradigm the decision where to locate is a decision between different foreign markets. The location factors considered have to be valid proxies for host countryrelated L advantages. Home-host relationships, often used in empirical models (e.g. 
IV. Data and Variables

Dependent Variable
The bilateral-net-FDI-outflow from home country (i) to host country (j) for the years 1995 property and equipment (PPE), which reflects real capital (fixed assets). As Hines (1996, p. 11) puts it: "PPE probably more closely corresponds to capital that enters production functions." For example, Gorter and Parikh (2003, p. 197) equity -and, of course, debt. No firm is able to acquire only real capital without the financial claims and liabilities. Therefore, we believe that we capture these components of FDI besides the "real capital" when using FDI flows. Also, the mobility of capital in the form of the location decision of the MNE is reflected in the annual FDI flow, which is not location-bound, rather than to the largely location-bound capital stock invested abroad during earlier periods.
Independent Variables
As we are entirely concerned with the second question raised above (where to locate?) our independent variables have to be valid proxies for host country related L-advantages. We base our choice of independent variables on the findings of some recent and/or widely cited studies, which however use different operationalisations. We group the location advantages as follows 7 :
market-related variables (host market size, distance, common border), efficiency-oriented location factors (unit labour costs, tax rate) and transition-specific location factors (inflation, privatisation, political risk).
Moreover, as we base our empirical specification on a gravity setting (see below) we additionally include home country size as an independent variable.
(a) Home country size (gdphome)
The larger a home country, the larger the potential for FDI outflows ceteris paribus, which suggests a positive coefficient.
activities in the host country and on the other hand, an affiliate of a foreign firm might be listed under domestic firms, if it is a registered company in the host country. 7 An alternative classification would be one between supply and demand (Mold, 2003) , our demand variable being the host market size whereas all other explanatory variables are supply related.
(b) Host market size (gdphost)
In theory market size is positively related to FDI as with a larger host market the likelihood that MNEs will be able to recoup the costs of their foreign investment increases (Navaretti and Venables 2004) . We therefore expect a positive sign of the estimated coefficient.
Distance is an important determinant of FDI (Brainard 1997) . It is especially relevant for production FDI where economies of scale on the affiliate plant level have to be weighed against the costs of exporting. This measure is standard in gravity-type models and has been used in other specifications explaining FDI. Distance is important for FDI especially as it is a proxy for different types of costs, like transportation costs, communication costs, synchronisation costs and costs accruing due to cultural distance (Head 2003) . While large distance may encourage FDI due to an internalisation-advantage it also may discourage FDI due to the lack of market know-how, higher communication and information costs and differences in culture and institutions Buch and Lipponer 2004) . Hence from a theoretical point of view the sign of the distance coefficient is ambiguous a priori (see Markusen and Maskus 2002 ). Yet, in our case we expect a negative sign, as intra-firm trade flows between parent and affiliate tend to be high in the case of vertical FDI (VFDI) where the costs of re-exporting is an important determinant of overall cost. Secondly, even with horizontal FDI (HFDI), distance matters and we expect a negative sign, if affiliates are relatively new, as is often the case in the CEECs. New affiliates typically depend on headquarter services and intermediate inputs supplied by the parent. Thirdly, the negative impact of distance on FDI has been shown by many studies, notably by Markusen and Maskus (2002) , who discriminate between various theories of FDI.
For discrete choices like the location decision of MNEs the average tax rate is the relevant measure of tax burden (e.g. Devereux and Griffith 1999) . Moreover, for international investment decisions beatrs are the relevant L-factor to reflect the tax component of the location decision of MNEs (Bellak et al. 2006) . We also use the statutory tax rate (statrate) alternatively to the beatr in one of the specifications below. We expect a negative sign of the estimated coefficients. Yet, the coefficient of the beatr should be substantially larger in absolute value than the coefficient on statrate. For further details concerning assumptions made in the calculation of beatrs see the appendix.
(e) Privatisation (privrev)
Privatisation revenues on an annual basis are used to reflect progress in privatisation. We expect a positive sign of the coefficient as a higher degree of privatisation implies more investment opportunities for foreign investors due to first-mover advantages, competition effects etc. In our view privrev is a better measure than the sometimes used index of the private-sector share in total economy as published by the EBRD. This index has little variation over time as it varies, if at all, only in steps of 5 percentage points. It hence may underestimate the speed in the privatisation progress in several years.
(f) Unit labour costs (ulc) According to the public debate low labour costs are among the most important determinants of inward FDI in the CEEC-8. This reasoning is in line with evidence reported e.g., in
Hunya (2004) who suggests that after the first wave of vertical FDI in the CEECs, FDI have shifted "further East" due to increasing labour costs in some of the CEEC-8. Bedi and Cieslik (2002) find that industries which receive more FDI also reveal higher wages and a higher wage growth. Yet, for Poland, they find a strong negative correlation between FDI and wage levels (-0.32). One explanation is again the distinction between market-oriented and efficiency-oriented FDI, which varies by industry (ibidem, p. 13). Thus, in general low labour costs of the host country should exert a positive impact on efficiency FDI. Labour costs should also have a negative impact in case of horizontal FDI, just like other input factors like energy costs, the tax burden or costs of raw materials. In cases where labour costs carry a positive sign, this is a hint towards an omitted variable bias, indicating purchasing power of consumers, a high skill-level in case of horizontal FDI etc.
Our variable which measures labour costs is a measure of unit labour costs (ulc). In the literature, various definitions of ulc are used, but there is hardly a satisfactory reasoning for the particular type of ulc chosen. Therefore, we discuss this issue in the Appendix in greater detail.
In countries in transition, property rights may be insecure, given expropriations, and political stability may be low. Hence, political risk may play a role as a determinant of FDI, too. As Navaretti and Venables (2004, p. 6) argue "political risk and instability seems to be an important deterrent to inward FDI". We expect a negative relationship (a positive coefficient due to the measurement, see Appendix) between political risk and FDI.
Inflation is included as a proxy for macroeconomic instabilities, which transition countries may be confronted with (Buch and Lipponer 2004) . We expect a negative sign of the coefficients estimated. But, for our sample it is important to note that inflation has been brought down substantially compared to the early transition period. Hence, it may no longer have a large impact on FDI.
This variable is considered additionally to distance between home-and host country as center-to-center distance may overstate the effective distance between home and host countries (Head 2003) . We expect a positive sign of the estimated coefficient.
tar is defined as the ratio of tariffs on imports over imports of goods and services. From a theoretical point of view the sign of the coefficient of this variable is a priori ambiguous depending on the underlying motive for FDI. If the observed FDI is mainly HFDI, the market imperfection theory of FDI suggests a positive sign. In this case HFDI is observed due to an internalisation advantage ("tariff-jumping" FDI). If on the other hand FDI is mainly VFDI, theory suggests a negative sign (e.g. Frenkel et al. 2004; Navaretti and Venables 2004) . In the case of VFDI high trade costs can be seen as a locationdisadvantage, which deters FDI. For our sample it is again important to note that tariffs have been brought down substantially. tar, hence, may no longer have a large impact on FDI. Table 5 summarises the discussion of individual L-factors. Market-related factors are positively, efficiency-related factors are negatively related and the sign of transitionspecific factors depends on the measure used.
[Table5 here]
Descriptive data analysis
Our data set constitutes a balanced panel of bilateral net-FDI flows for seven home countries (i), eight host countries (j) and nine years (t), resulting in 504 observations. Since log FDI flows are used as dependent variable, which can be negative, we drop 45 observations (about 9 percent of our data set). Moreover, the search for unsystematic outliers 8 in the dependent and independent variables via box-plots and added variable plots pinpoints four data points as potential outliers, which are dropped from the analysis. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for our dataset and reveals that the between variability is higher than the within variability.
[Table6 here] Table 7 shows the variance inflation factors for our independent variables. As no individual factor is larger than 10, multi-collinearity should not cause a problem in our analysis (Hamilton 2005) .
[Table7 here]
V. Empirical Specification and Methodology
We base our analysis on a gravity setting. Firstly, models of this type can easily be combined with the OLI-paradigm. Secondly, they seem to be successful in explaining bilateral trade flows and more recently bilateral FDI flows as well (e.g. Frenkel et al 2004 , Brainard 1997 
where:
lnFDI ijt is the log of net-FDI-outflow from home country i to host country j at time t (lnfdimn);
lnY it is the log of GDP in country i at time t and the same for lnY jt for country j (lngdphome and lngdphost);
lnDIST ij is the log of the distance between countries i and j (lndist); X ijt are location factors which vary between country-pairs and over time (e.g. beatr)
Z ij are location factors which vary over country-pairs only (i.e. combord) W jt are location factors which vary over time and over host countries (e.g. pp)
γ t are time dummies (TD) α ij are country-pair-specific effects; e ijt is the remainder error term.
Most of the right hand side variables in (1) represent different location factors in the spirit of the OLI-paradigm. The only variable which does not constitute a location factor, is lnY it which captures home country size. It is important to note, that we consider the country-pair specific effects as random. This is for two reasons. First, Hausman-tests 11 on fixed versus random effects show that the random effects assumptions cannot be rejected. Hence using the random effects estimator results in more efficient estimates than the fixed effects 9 These variables may be called "gravity-specific". 10 Note, that this specification includes that introduced by Mátyás 1997 as a special case (Cheng and Wall 2004; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003) . 11 We perform two types of Hausman-tests. First, if no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity seems to be present and if the other requirements of the original Hausman-test are fulfilled (e.g. the difference between fixed effects and random effects variance matrices is invertible) we use the original Hausman-test. Second, in case of non-spherical errors or a non-positive definite difference in the fixed effects and random effects variance matrices we follow Wooldridge (2002, p. 290ff.) and perform a regression based Hausman-test (with cluster robust standard errors).
13 estimator does. Furthermore, it allows estimating the impact of time fixed variables (i.e.
dist and combord) on FDI flows. Second, from a more substantive point of view, the random effects approach is relevant here as we are concerned with the decision of MNEs between various host countries. In this decision differences between host countries matter, which are captured by the random effects estimator. Concerning time effects we consider these to be fixed as it does not make sense to assume that we have a random sample of time periods. Time effects account inter alia for the business cycle, for common shocks and common trends (Verbeek 2004, Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003) .
Our estimation strategy is based on two pillars. We first estimate equ.
(1) with the gravity specific variables only and the beatr included. Then we introduce additional location factors stepwise to this basic specification ("pillar 1 strategy"). Second, we apply a general to specific strategy, starting with the most general model (1) Table 8 shows the results of our pillar 1 strategy. The coefficients on the gravity-specific variables are always significant with the expected sign with the exception of home country size. The magnitude of the coefficients on distance and host market size is reasonable as 12 Significant at least at the 5% level.
VI. Results
they are in line with the theoretical prediction of the gravity model and with empirical evidence for gravity models explaining international trade flows (Head 2003; Leamer and Levinsohn 1995) . In some models, the relatively low and statistically insignificant coefficient on home country size is not unexpected as relatively small countries (Austria and The Netherlands) are the main source countries of FDI in our sample.
The coefficient on beatr is always statistically significant and negative in the range of -3. 2003) reveal significant negative effects of inflation on annual inward FDI-flows. Also, political stability (risk) does not seem to be a distinguishing location factor within the CEEC-8. This is in marked contrast to other studies, especially those using data from the beginning of the transformation process till the end of the 1990ies (e.g. Carstensen and Toubal 2004; Frenkel et al. 2004) . Furthermore, statistical tests show that time dummies are mostly jointly significant and that the random effects assumption is valid for each specification.
[ Table 8 here]
Next, our analysis proceeds with our pillar-2 strategy. The results are shown in table 9.
Model 8 is our most general model including all location factors as well as time dummies.
The results are not very different from those of our pillar-1 strategy: beatr, privrev and ulc are statistically significant with the expected sign and all other variables have the expected signs but are statistically insignificant. Moreover the magnitude of the estimates is in line with those of our pillar-1 strategy.
Dropping insignificant variables step-by-step beginning with the most insignificant variable and controlling for possible multi-collinearity effects we finally end up with model 9. This includes the gravity-specific variables as well as beatr, ulc (both efficiency-related) and privrev (transition specific). Again, statistical tests show that the random effects specification is valid. Further tests, using inefficient but consistent pooled OLS estimates, suggest that model 9 has satisfactory properties from a statistical point of view.
Particularly, the Reset-test suggests that our linear specification is sufficient. Moreover, studentized residuals do not show the presence of outliers using a cut off-level of +/-3.5 (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003) . The highest variance inflation factor of 2.41 implies that multi-collinearity should not be a problem in model 9.
[ Table 9 here]
The tax-rate elasticity in model 9 is -4. How does this measure compare to results of earlier studies? The derived semi-elasticity is lower than the one reported by Ederveen (2003 and . In our view this result indicates that FDI in the CEECs is primarily of a market-seeking nature, where the tax burden matters, but is not the primary determinant. Moreover, it is convenient to compare our results to the results of the study carried out by Carstensen and Toubal, since it covers partly the same countries as well as a similar time period. Also, their study is the only study out of the 7 studies on CEECs surveyed above that has carried out the analysis on a bilateral level like ours. The median value of the semi-elasticity derived by us on the 14 The mean value of all estimates is about -4.0.
16 ten semi-elasticities reported in Carstensen and Toubal is -1.6, thus, much lower than ours in absolute value. It must be kept in mind, however, that they base their analysis on statutory tax rates rather than effective tax rates.
To conclude the discussion of the efficiency-related variables we take a closer look on the impact of the unit labour costs. Model 9 shows that a one percentage-point increase in ulc reduces FDI flows by about 3.1 percent. Comparing this estimate with those of other studies is notoriously difficult, since almost every study uses another definition of labour costs. Lansbury et al. (1994) use unit labour costs in a host country relative to other potential hosts in Central Europe and find that is has a significant negative impact on FDI.
Inclusion of relative wage and relative productivity measures as in Holland and Pain (1998) appears to leave only the relative wage variable significant, while productivity differentials across host countries do not appear significant, which according to the authors implies "that considerations of comparative factor costs across countries influence some investment decisions" (p. 16). Clausing and Dorobantu (2005) Concerning the privatisation process our analysis shows a significant and positive impact of privrev throughout. At first sight, the coefficient on privrev, although significant with the correct sign, seems very low, as FDI flows increase by about 0.03% if privatisation revenues increase by one million Euro. Privatisation revenues should be correlated with gross FDI inflows, if foreign investors primarily benefit from the privatisation. Yet, given the fact that we explain net FDI flows, a low correlation would indicate that gross inflows may be compensated by high capital outflows resulting from a divestment or sale of a subsidiary or profit transfers. In some cases, as described above, net outflows are actually negative, implying a potentially large difference between net and gross outflows.
Other studies use the EBRD's private sector share (see e.g. Lansbury et al. 1996, Holland and Pain 1998; Carstensen and Toubal 2004) , the overall transition index (e.g. Edmiston et al. 2003) or the method of privatisation (e.g. Holland and Pain 1998; Carstensen and Toubal 2004) to capture the effect the privatisation process has on FDI flows. In many cases the impact turns out to be insignificant, because the share variable does not vary much over time. Two notable exceptions are Carstensen and Toubal (2004) , where the "method of privatisation" (i.e. vouchers vs. other methods) turns out to have a significant effect on FDI inflows and Holland and Pain (1998) , who conclude that "countries with a program of direct privatisation through cash sales have attracted relatively higher inward investment than those countries using voucher privatisation." (p. 16) Table 10 shows the Beta coefficients corresponding to model 9. 15 The gravity-specific variables are the most important determinants of FDI flows and effective taxes as important as the privatisation process as location factor. Moreover, unit labour costs are the least important variable in our specification. These results imply that the role of taxes as a location factor must not be underscored or over-emphasized, relative to that of other location determinants.
Beta-Coefficients
An alternative measure of corporate tax burden
In order to check our argument that using the statutory (overall) corporate income tax rate instead of the appropriate effective tax rate makes indeed a difference, we replace our measure of the beatr by the statutory tax rate in model 9. Results for model 10 reported in table 10 show a substantial drop of the semi-elasticity to about -2.4, which is (marginally) not significant at the 5% level. This confirms our expectation and implies that indeed, the relatively low value of the semi-elasticity derived in our meta-analysis is partly due to the use of statutory tax rates in empirical estimations. This result is also of importance with regard to evaluating the effectiveness of governments' tax cuts, which might have had a larger effect on inward FDI than earlier studies reveal.
[ Table 10 here]
Robustness and Stability Analysis
15 These are calculated by applying the usual formula for standardized coefficients on the random effects estimates using the overall standard deviations for the random effects transformed variables of model 9.
We check the robustness of our preferred specification in model 9 against the impact of possible cross-section outliers by stepwise dropping host countries (e.g. Winner 2005) . Table 11 reports the resulting minimum and maximum values of the coefficient estimates and the coefficient derived from our preferred specification (model 9) as well as the country excluded. The results are robust with respect to dropping countries as no coefficient changes sign and none becomes insignificant with the exception of the coefficient on ulc when the Czech Republic and especially when Slovenia are excluded. The relatively low FDI flows to Slovenia may be partly due to the high unit labour costs when compared to other host countries in our sample.
[ Table 11 here]
The stability of the coefficients on beatr, ulc and privrev is checked by inter-acting these [ Table 12 here]
Long-run estimates
Finally, we present long-run estimates derived via OLS regression on the time-averaged cross-sectional data (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003) . In the long run transition-specific variables should not play any role as drivers of FDI and efficiency-related FDI should gain in importance. Hence, we expect the coefficient on privrev to become insignificant and those of ulc and beatr to increase in magnitude.
The results reported in table 13 (model 14 and 15) indeed confirm these expectations. The cost-factors gain in importance in the long-run, implying that the share of efficiencyoriented FDI in total FDI flows increases and that efficiency-related location factors will gain importance. The tax-rate elasticity increases substantially to about -9.3. Its relative increase -the semi-elasticity more than doubles -is higher than that of the other variables considered. Moreover, as expected the transition-specific variable is no longer statistically significant. Also note that this substantial increase in the tax-rate elasticity is again in line with the recent survey of DeMooij and Ederveen (2005) . They report a typical tax-rate elasticity for cross-section models of -11.65.
[ Table 13 here]
VII. Summary
Recent empirical evidence for the CEECs has shown that a high corporate tax burden acts as a deterrent to FDI flows, since it affects the profitability of investments negatively. Yet, these studies do not make use of the recent model of effective tax rates developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999) thus probably using a flawed indicator of the corporate tax burden.
The aim of this paper was to provide the first empirical application of effective average tax rates on the bilateral level to explaining FDI flows to the CEEC-8. Based on the OLIparadigm and a Panel-gravity setting we find that FDI is positively related to both source and host-market size as well as to progress in privatisation and that FDI is inversely related to the distance between home and host countries as well as to the corporate tax burden and to unit labour costs.
In summary four points are worth noting:
First, the derived tax-elasticity is very robust and differs from earlier results on CEECs, pointing to a larger importance of tax policy for company location decisions. Considering the relative importance of supply (dist, ulc, beatr) and demand factors (gdphost) in the CEECs (cf . Table 10 ) our analysis confirms e.g., Mold's result that "the extent to which demand-related variables are usually more reliable determinants of FDI inflows than supply-side factors in econometric analysis." (2003, p. 44) Second, the relative importance of the corporate tax rate as a determinant of FDI must not be over-emphasised as our results reveal that at least during the period 1995-2003 the tax burden had no exceptional influence on FDI flows in the CEEC-8 as compared to other determinants.
Third, the differences in the absolute value of the semi-elasticities when compared to earlier studies are clearly partly due to the use of beatrs. The semi-elasticity derived after replacing the beatr by statrate is indeed substantially lower.
Fourth, long-run estimates lead us to believe that VFDI will gain in importance compared to HFDI. This is due to the relatively large increase in our estimates for ulc and beatr in our long-run specification. This reasoning is consistent with surveys of the motives stated by foreign investors, even if they usually tend to overstate market-related motives ex post.
While this study is a step towards further explanations of FDI flows to the CEECs, there are several limitations to our analysis, which mainly concern the exclusion of location factors like size and quality of public infrastructure. This omission is due to the lack of meaningful data.
Also, special investment incentives (e.g. regional, R&D) are not included. As there are Report, London.
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Eurostat (2002) European Union Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook 2001,
Luxembourg.
OECD (2004) International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1991 -2002,
Paris.
• European Tax Handbook • gdphome gdphome is the home country's GDP measured in million Euro. It is taken from Eurostat's New Cronos database.
• gdphost gdphost is the host country's nominal GDP measured in million Euro. It is taken from Eurostat's New Cronos database.
• dist dist is defined as the geographical distance between the capital cities of the home and the host country in kilometres. Data are taken from various internet sources.
• beatr
The bilateral average effective tax rate is calculated according to the model developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999) . The calculation is based on the following assumptions and constant nominal exchange rate a weighted average structure of assets (buildings / machinery / inventory) of 55% / 35% / 10% a weighted average structure across the various types of financing (retained earnings / equity / debt): 55% / 10% / 35% for parent and 33.3% / 33.3% / 33.3% for subsidiary Our assumptions about the asset structure differ from those of other studies, which mainly follow OECD (1991), because data on inventories in the CEESs show that they are far less important than they have been within the OECD as reported in 1991. Instead we assign a higher weight to investment in buildings. Note also that we do not include any tax incentives in our measure since the choice of relevant incentives in each home-and host country would be arbitrary. beatr is measured in percent.
• statrate
Is the overall statutory corporate income tax-rate of a host country. Values are taken from the European Tax Handbook. It includes local business taxes and is defined in percent.
• privrev Annual privatisation revenues are on the basis of the stock figures on privatisation revenues in percent of GDP published in the annual EBRD Transition Report. Annual privatisation revenues are expressed in million Euro.
• ulc ulc are defined as the costs of input (labour) that is required to produce one unit of output.
They are measured either in nominal terms or in real terms and are expressed either in local currency or in common currency. They can be used in absolute terms or in relative terms across locations (countries, respectively, see e.g., Someshwar and Tang 2004) .
Given these various definitions, one has to carefully choose the appropriate type of unit labour costs. For our purpose, which is explaining the location choice of a foreign MNE between various host countries, we argue that the following criteria are important:
• First, since we base our analyyis on the OLI-paradigm we do not use relative unit labour costs, but ulc in absolute terms.
• Second, since the location choice is international rather than on the national level (e.g.
between regions of the same country) we use ulc expressed in a common currency.
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• Third, since the host countries of FDI experienced divergent price-level developments over the examination period, with some countries showing relatively large inflation and hence, exchange-rate movements, we consider real ulc as appropriate. Note, that this consideration is also based on the practical fact that nominal ulc are calculated from the compensation of employees in current prices over GDP in constant prices, high inflation would eventually leave the compensation of employees larger than GDP.
We apply the following formula to calculate real unit labour costs in common currency, which is used in a similar form e.g. by van Ark and Monnikhof (2000) . • tar tar is defined as the ratio of "tariffs on imports" (from Eurostat, Main National Accounts, Position D212: "taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT", position S13: General Government) over "imports of goods and services", taken from the European Commission's AMECO database.
• risk risk captures political risk. Data are taken from various issues of "Euromoney". 25 is the maximum value (lowest possible risk level) and zero the minimum value. The Euromoney overall risk indicator is not used, since it includes a structural break, which is often neglected in empirical studies, but which renders it meaningless as to its time dimension.
• pp pp is a proxy for inflation measured as the increase in producer prices. Data are taken from various editions of EBRD's Transition Report.
• combord
The common border variable is 1 if home and host countries share a common border and zero otherwise. Dunning (1988) 17 The overall tax-rate for undistributed profits is shown. 
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